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Abstract
Conflicts within the Malaysian federation have been rooted in socio-economic
disparities and the struggle for control of natural resource rents, which State
Governments previously had exclusive control over, as originally provided for by the
federal constitution. The advance of fiscal centralization since then has also aggravated
federal-state tensions, which have been relatively ignored due to the long-standing
Malaysian pre-occupation with inter-ethnic tensions. Inter-regional resource transfers
and central fiscal and political dominance have been used to undermine the more
independent State Governments, especially those held by opposition parties. While the
federal government is clearly dominant, central control over the State Governments has
varied, especially in Sabah and Sarawak, with the continued hegemony of the national
ruling coalition depending on successfully combining the carrot with the stick.
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1 Introduction
This paper reviews the relationship between economic development, public policy and
conflict containment in Malaysia, focussing especially on regional tensions within the
Malaysian federation. The main focus of conflict containment efforts in Malaysia has
been on inter-ethnic tensions, especially between the politically and demographically
dominant Muslim ethnic Malays, who also comprise the vast majority of Bumiputera
indigenes in Peninsular Malaysia, and the more business successful and ubiquitous
ethnic Chinese, especially since the post-election riots of May 1969.
This paper suggests that while understandable, this singular public policy priority has
neglected other potential sources of conflict, most importantly regional frustrations and
tensions, which have long been important, though not unchanging. It goes on to identify
poverty and fiscal discrimination as the likely sources of regional resentment, and
suggests a likely vicious cycle of federal fiscal bias against opposition-controlled state
governments reinforcing regional resentment expressed in support for ‘regional’
opposition. However, the federal government has sought to address this by seeking to
control and claim control for federal government spending in such states in contrast to
the opposition-held state government’s meagre budgetary resources.
2 Malaysia’s political economy
For over a century, Malaysian economic growth spurts have mainly been export-
associated, if not led. The openness of the Malaysian economy – high even by
developing country standards – is due to the structural transformation it has undergone,
especially during and since the British colonial period. Like so many other ex-colonies,
contemporary Malaysian history has also been complicated by the political
developments of the colonial era. Of course, the reshaping of the Malaysian economy
did not stop with independence, but continues to the present, accelerating in the post-
colonial era, especially since the 1970s.
Malaysia’s export-led growth record in the last century has been quite impressive.
During colonial times, Malaya was, by far, Britain’s most profitable colony, credited
with providing much of the export earnings that financed British post-war imperial
reconstruction. However, only a few industries were allowed to develop by the colonial
authorities, who generally considered the colonies as suppliers of raw materials and
importers of manufactured goods. Most industries then were set up to reduce transport
costs of exported or imported goods, such as factories for smelting (refining) tin-ore and
bottling imported drinks. Local industries often developed most when economic
relations with the colonial power were weak, e.g. during the Great Depression and the
Japanese Occupation.
The Malayan economy grew impressively, especially during the first quarter of the
twentieth century, to become the single most profitable British colony. Malaysia’s
economic infrastructure (e.g. railways, roads, ports, utilities, etc.) – so crucial for
profitable capitalist investment – was generally more developed than in most other
British possessions other than the settler colonies. Such infrastructure construction –2
mainly using imported British materials – was paid for by taxes levied on the population
by the colonial government.
Colonial monopolies thwarted the development of a strong local capitalist class
producing for the domestic market; instead, local investors found it more profitable to
engage in production for export, commerce and usury, i.e. largely complementing,
rather than opposing colonial economic interests. Malays remained largely marginal to
the growing capitalist sector, with the elite integrated into the colonial state apparatus,
and the masses remaining in the countryside as peasants. Instead, emerging business
opportunities were mainly taken by some of the more urbanized and commercially
better-connected Chinese.
After their ignominious defeat by the Japanese at the beginning of the Pacific War in the
early 1940s, the British returned to reclaim its possessions in 1945 in the face of strong,
but ethnically segmented anti-colonial movements. The military repression of the
communist-led armed insurgency from June 1948 was not especially successful in the
early years until it sought to ‘win hearts and minds’ from 1951. The new strategy
involved a range of political reforms to establish partially elected legislatures and
municipal authorities for the first time, labour reforms to build and legitimize a
‘moderate’ and ‘responsible’ anti-communist trade union movement, agrarian reforms
to reduce rural exploitation and poverty as well as to consolidate an ethnic Malay
yeoman peasantry, and the beginnings of pro-Malay ethnic affirmative action
programmes.
These reforms – mainly in response to a major threat to the security of the late-colonial
state and associated colonial business interests – have had a profound and ongoing
impact on the development-conflict containment nexus. The colonial authorities
reluctantly responded to the challenge with rural development initiatives it had never
previously considered, let alone implemented, as well as co-opting and legitimizing
reforms allowing greater popular participation in politics and trade unions on the one
hand besides ‘protecting’ the Malay community on the other.
In the post-Second World War period, Malaysia has experienced relatively rapid
growth, particularly during the Korean War boom, the oil boom of the 1970s and with
the relocation of East Asian industry into Southeast Asia for a decade from the late
1980s. Since 1955, the same ruling coalition has been continuously in power at the
decisive federal level, though the nature and degree of state intervention and public
sector expansion has changed considerably, almost coming full circle by the mid-1990s
compared to the situation following independence for Malaya (now Peninsular
Malaysia) in 1957, and fiscal expansion in the 1970s and early 1980s.
After independence in 1957, and especially during the 1960s, the Malaysian economy
diversified from the twin pillars of the colonial economy, i.e. rubber and tin. The
Malaysian economy continued to experience rapid economic growth in the first quarter
century after independence. The average annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in Peninsular Malaysia was 5.8 per cent during 1957-70 (Rao, 1976),
while the GDP for the whole of Malaysia rose by an average of 7.8 per cent per year
between 1971 and 1980 despite greater economic instability (Malaysia, 1981).
Primary commodity production continued to dominate the economy in the early years
after independence. In fact, Malaysia extended its colonial pre-eminence in rubber, tin3
and pepper to palm oil, pepper, tropical hardwoods and cocoa. In the mid-1970s,
petroleum production – off the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia – began
providentially, as oil prices soared after 1973. Since the early 1980s, petroleum gas
production – almost exclusively for the Japanese economy – has come on stream,
offering yet another primary commodity engine for the growth of the Malaysian
economy. Cocoa production, mainly in Sabah, also became increasingly significant
from the early 1980s.
Meanwhile, biased and conservative, but nonetheless pro-active post-colonial rural
development efforts – arguably, mainly to secure rural electoral support – contrasted
with British colonial neglect, especially in the pre-war period. Initially, such efforts
were aimed at securing crucial electoral support from the Malay yeoman peasantry
without drastic redistribution measures. Since the early 1980s, however, under
Mahathir, official policy has sought to develop commercial agriculture – involving
larger farms, using more profitable, productivity-raising and cost-saving modern
management methods – for export markets. Agricultural diversification continues, but
there is no obvious candidate for leading, let alone sustaining future growth.
After independence, the government encouraged industries to manufacture previously
imported goods. Most of these import-substituting industries were set up as subsidiaries
of foreign companies to finished goods produced with imported materials for very
profitable sale within the protected domestic market. Many of these industries only
replaced imports of finished goods with semi-finished goods (e.g. the motor car
assembly industry). Since most of these industries are generally capital-intensive, not
requiring many workers), unemployment as well as wage rates in these industries rose
during this phase. The technology used, usually developed for and more suited to
foreign conditions, was typically imported from the parent company abroad. Hence,
these industries often generated relatively little employment, whether directly or
indirectly, in linked industries.
Policies to attract such industries have often involved reduction of government tax
revenue. The size of the local market was also limited by the level and distribution of
income. By the mid-1960s, the problems of import-substituting industrialization had
become quite apparent. In 1965, the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA,
now known as MIDA, the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority) was set up to
attract industrial investment. By this time too, to reduce production costs, some trans-
national corporations were planning to relocate their more labour-intensive production
processes abroad, often to East Asia.
3 Regional tensions and federalism
Although the Malaysian economy has changed significantly since independence, many
features reflecting uneven development can be traced to the crucial formative decades
under colonial rule that shaped its economic structure. For instance, differences between
the East Coast and the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia can be traced to uneven
regional growth dating back to the location of the early tin mines, staggered colonial
annexation and infrastructure development, as well as subsequent economic growth
reflecting prior unevenness.4
Differences between the rice growing North and the rest of the peninsula are related to
demographic history as well as the British policy of preserving Malay peasants as rice
farmers, despite the rational peasant preference for rubber cultivation, which threatened
British plantation interests. The urban-rural gap is, of course, reflective of the changing
roles of town and country in Malaysian capital accumulation. The relative backwardness
of the peasantry compared to plantations is only the most obvious of various differences
in the rural economy. Ethnic differences have often coincided with class, occupational
and other differences originating in the colonial economy.
Malaysia is now a federation made up of the eleven States of Peninsular Malaysia, the
former Federation of Malaya (including the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, the
capital), plus the former British Borneo possessions of Sabah and Sarawak (Table 1).
The peninsular States gained independence from the British in 1957 and formed the
Federation of Malaya prior to the formation of the Malaysian Federation in 1963.
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak gained independence from Britain through the formation
of Malaysia.
Table 1
Malaysia: area and population by State, 1999
State Area (sq. km.) Population (thousands)
Johore 18,986 (5.6%) 2,670.7 (11.8%)
Kedah 9,426 (2.9%) 1,579.8 (7.0%)
Kelantan 14,920 (4.5%) 1,522.2 (6.7%)
Melaka 1,651(0.5%) 593.2 (2.6%)
Negri Sembilan 6,643 (2.0%) 836.5 (3.7%)
Pahang 35,964 (10.9%) 1,291.5 (5.7%)
Perak 21,005 (6.4%) 2,118.1 (9.3%)
Perlis 795 (0.2%) 226.2 (1.0%)
Pulau Pinang 1,030 (0.3%) 1,246.8 (5.5%)
Sabah 73,619 (22.3%) 2,970.4 (12.7%)
Sarawak 124,449 (37.7%) 2,027.1 (8.9%)
Selangor 7,955 (2.4%) 3,188.7 (14.0%)
Terengganu 12,955 (3.9%) 1,033.5 (4.6%)
Malaysia 329,758 (100.0%) 22,710 (100.0%)
Source: Department of Statistics, Handbook of Statistics, Malaysia, 1999.
The British wanted to disengage from governing Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore, while
safeguarding their interests in the region. Both British and local leaders perceived
Peninsular Malaysia as Malay-dominated, and capable of containing leftist Chinese
ascendancy in Singapore by incorporating the latter. The larger and more diverse
indigenous populations of Sabah and Sarawak (Table 2) were also perceived as
offsetting Chinese domination of the federation. Sabah and Sarawak were less
developed than the other States and hoped for net transfers of development funds by
joining the Federation.5
Table 2
Sabah and Sarawak: population, 1999 (thousands)
Sabah Sarawak
Bumiputera*: Bumiputera*:
Malay 192.7 (6.5%) Malay 435.0 (21.5%)
Dusun/Kadazan 529.4 (17.8%) Iban 576.0 (28.4%)
Bajau 332.0 (11.2%) Bidayuh 164.5 (8.1%)
Murut 863.0 (2.9%) Melanau 112.8 (5.6%)
Other Bumiputera 393.4 (13.2%) Other Bumiputera 117.4 (5.8%)
Non-Bumiputera 1436.6 (48.4%) Non-Bumiputera 621.4 (30%)
Total 2970.4 (100.0%) Total 2027.1 (100.0%)
Non-Malay Bumiputera 1341.1 (45.1%) Non-Malay Bumiputera 970.7 (47.9%)
(% Malaysia's population) (5.9%) (% Malaysia's population) (4.3%)
* Indigenous ethnic groups
Source: Department of Statistics, State/District Data Bank, 1999.
In 1961, the first Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman endorsed the British
plan to form Malaysia to include the eleven states of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo
(now Sabah), Sarawak and Brunei, i.e. all the former British territories in the region.
The oil-rich sultanate of Brunei withdrew before the new federation was established in
September 1963. Before the Japanese Occupation (during the Second World War),
North Borneo was run as a virtual fiefdom by a British chartered company, while
Sarawak was ruled by a series of white rajahs from the Brooke family. After the
Japanese Occupation, they were both administered by the British Colonial Office, but
still quite separately from Malaya and Singapore.
Nevertheless, the formation of Malaysia was pushed through by the British, despite the
serious difficulties involved, not least of which was the contrived nature of the new
nation, convenient only to the former colonial power. Within less than two years,
Singapore left the Federation in August 1965, after acrimonious conflicts with leaders in
the peninsula. Singapore has since industrialized rapidly, while also developing as a
major regional and global centre for financial services besides consolidating its position
as a major international logistics centre.
Hence, since August 1965, Malaysia has included the eleven states of what was then
called West Malaysia and the two Borneo states of East Malaysia. In the early 1970s,
after the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, the official terminology changed to
Peninsular Malaysia for the old Malaya, and Sabah and Sarawak, probably to limit any
nascent sense of East Malaysian solidarity. After all, only about a third of those
surveyed in Sabah (the former British North Borneo) and Sarawak had wanted to join
Malaysia. Most Malaysians, especially in the peninsula, have long forgotten that both
Borneo states joined with the former Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia, and that
their leaders and people expected to enjoy privileged treatment within the new
federation.6
One of the major economically significant consequences of incorporation into Malaysia
for the Borneo States was becoming part of the expanded federation’s principal customs
area, e.g. in terms of being subject to the same import and export duties. This has
presumably limited the potential for import-substituting industrialization in the East
Malaysian States, with protection extended instead to such industries established in the
peninsula, with its larger market. Hence, the Borneo States have been obliged to pay
higher prices for protected goods from the peninsula without being able to develop
import-substituting manufacturing industries of their own, as infrastructure, cost and
market size considerations favour such industrial location on the peninsula.
Natural resource exports from Sabah and Sarawak have ensured healthy trade surpluses
for the federation as a whole (Wee, 1995). Malaysia’s merchandise trade account would
have had more modest surpluses, if not more frequent deficits, if not for the primary
commodity exports from Sabah and Sarawak. On the other hand, most new import-
substituting as well as export-oriented industries have been located in the peninsula.
Although the armed struggle led by the North Kalimantan People’s Army (Paraku)
petered out in the 1960s and 1970s, desires for greater autonomy, including flirtations
with secession, continued into the 1980s. However, the federal government in Kuala
Lumpur has successfully forged dominant Muslim-Chinese partnerships in both states,
which have alienated many of the politically and economically un-influential, though
demographically numerous, non-Muslim Bumiputeras. Most academic and political
analyses of Malaysian unity have ignored the changing tensions involving Sabah and
Sarawak, and the complexities of Malaysian federalism.
Instead, most analyses focus on the other important source of conflict in post-colonial
Peninsular Malaysia. The ethnic conflict between the stereotyped politically dominant
Malays and the economically successful Chinese dramatically came to a head with race
riots in May 1969 (Butcher, 2001). This conflict is often articulated in terms of the
rivalry between indigenous Bumiputera, literally sons of the soil – i.e. Malays, the
aboriginal Orang Asli and the Muslim as well as non-Muslim indigenous communities
of Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo island – and non-autochthonous non-Bumiputera, i.e.
mainly ethnic Chinese and Indians.
4 Ethnicity and the New Economic Policy (NEP)
Helped by favourable commodity prices and some early success in import-substituting
industrialization, the Malayan and then the Malaysian economy sustained a high growth
rate with low inflation until the early 1970s. Official statistics – though strictly non-
comparable for methodological reasons – suggests a worsening distribution of income
over the 1990s, a growing gap between town and country, and growing inequality
among all the major ethnic groups. Inequality in the Malay community increased most –
from a situation of least intra-ethnic inequality in 1957 to greatest inequality in 1970.
This growing inequality did not only result in growing inter-class tensions, but was
primarily perceived in ethnic terms, not least because of officially-sanctioned political
mobilization along racial lines. Hence, Malay resentment to domination by capital was
expressed primarily against ethnic Chinese, who comprise the bulk of the business
community, while non-Malay frustrations were directed against the Malay-dominated7
post-colonial state machinery, increasingly identified with United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the dominant partner in the ruling coalition.
Such popular ethnic perceptions resulted in widespread racially inspired opposition in
Peninsular Malaysia to the ruling Alliance government of the 1960s. The decade had
seen an import-substituting industrialization programme that generated relatively little
employment and had largely petered out by the mid-1960s. Rural development efforts,
initially inspired by counter-insurgency considerations in the early 1950s, increasingly
emphasized productivity increasing measures, while avoiding redistribution in favour of
the poorly capitalized land-hungry peasantry.
The general election results and ‘race riots’ of May 1969 reflected such ethnic
consequences and dimensions of the new post-colonial socio-economic structure.
Meanwhile, the emerging Malay middle class, who had nominal political control,
perceived the gradual decline of British economic hegemony giving way to Chinese
ascendance. This ‘political-bureaucratic’ fraction became more assertive from the mid-
1960s, establishing increased dominance after May 1969.
Foreign experts and international consultants encouraged the Malaysian government to
switch to export-oriented industrialization, which it did from the late 1960s. The
openness of the Malaysian economy has been deepened by new largely export-oriented
industries established since then. The Industrial Incentives Act was passed in 1968,
while labour laws were amended in 1969 to help create an investment climate more
attractive to such industries. Together with other new incentives, free trade zones and
other facilities were also provided for this purpose. These new export-oriented
industries seeking cheap labour succeeded in reducing unemployment at the expense of
wages until declining unemployment pushed wages up once again in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and again for a decade from the late 1980s.
Much of such manufacturing in Malaysia is still limited to relatively low-skill, labour-
intensive aspects of production, e.g. electronic component assembly, though more
skilled and complex production processes and training have developed, but somewhat
behind Singapore, which has emerged as a sort of regional centre in the new
international division of labour. The potential for and likelihood of such progress has
been and will be determined by the interests and preferences of trans-national
corporations, as well as their perceptions of likely prospects in alternative host
countries.
Hence, export-oriented industrialization has significant, but nonetheless limited
potential for sustained and integrated industrial development, especially because of the
technological dependence involved. Yet, despite this impressive performance, largely
attributable to favourable resource endowments and external conditions, it has become
increasingly clear, especially since the mid-1990s, that many of the sources of export-
led growth in the Malaysian economy are not indefinitely sustainable. On the other
hand, the very success of export-led growth in the past has probably discouraged serious
efforts to develop a more balanced and integrated national economy.
Much public policy since then, notably the New Economic Policy (NEP), first
announced in 1970, has been dominated by inter-ethnic distributional considerations,
and most public policy is widely seen through the lenses of ostensible ethnic interests.
Malaysia has implemented the NEP since 1971. The NEP has the two-pronged8
objectives of poverty reduction irrespective of race (ethnicity) and ‘restructuring
society’ to eliminate the identification of race with economic function and location, i.e.
reduce inter-ethnic socio-economic disparities between Bumiputera indigenes and the
non-Bumiputeras.
The Bumiputera are to be protected with constitutionally provided ‘special privileges’,
i.e. a form of positive discrimination or affirmative action. The ‘Bumiputera’ category
includes the indigenous peoples of Sabah, Sarawak and the Orang Asli in Peninsular
Malaysia, for whom the race riots of 1969 were largely irrelevant. The NEP is perceived
to have done relatively little for non-Muslim indigenous minorities, mainly in the
Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak.
Since Mahathir took over leadership of the government in 1981, he has introduced other
public policy priorities, gradually diluting the previously almost single-minded NEP
redistribution agenda. After some apparent (political and economic) success with partial
economic liberalization after the 1985-86 economic recession, the shift was
consolidated by declaring a broad new national project under the rubric of a new vision
for the nation to be achieved by the year 2020. Vision 2020 has since been affirmed by
the announcement of successor policies to the NEP in the form of the National
Development Policy associated with the Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000
(OPP2) and the National Vision Policy associated with the Third Outline Perspective
Plan, 2001-2010 (OPP3).
It is generally agreed that the NEP’s redistribution measures were conceived in response
to the events of May 1969, i.e. the pre-election ethnic tensions, the ruling coalition’s
electoral setback and the post-elections’ palace coup against the incumbent prime
minister. While redistributive in intent, NEP social policy enhanced Malaysian human
resources in ways that reduced poverty, especially among the children of the Malay
peasantry (Jomo and Gomez, 1997). In particular, greater education enabled them to
gain more remunerative modern sector employment. However, there is considerable
evidence (Jomo, 1989; Jomo, 1990) that much of the expenditure ostensibly allocated
for poverty reduction never really benefited the poor.
Instead, the NEP increasingly emphasized reducing inter-ethnic economic disparities,
especially between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese, rather than poverty reduction
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999). While the NEP probably reduced some ethnic Malay
resentments of Chinese economic success by accelerating the advance of Malay middle
class and business interests, it may well also have generated even greater Malay
expectations of their rights, entitlements and privileges under the Malaysian sun, thus
inadvertently fuelling inter-ethnic resentment at the same time.
Meanwhile, the same NEP probably fuelled non-Malay resentment of abuses associated
with UMNO’s political hegemony and its main policy consequence, the NEP itself.
While the NEP objectives of reducing poverty and inter-ethnic economic disparities
were presented as means for achieving ‘national unity’, primarily understood in terms of
ostensibly reducing Malay resentment against the Chinese, there is little real evidence
that this has been achieved with implementation of the NEP. The virtual absence of a
subsequent recurrence of inter-ethnic violence on a comparable massive scale is not
necessarily evidence of greater ‘national unity’, even as narrowly conceived in terms of
reduced inter-ethnic resentment.9
Table 3
Malaysia: summary of Federal and State Government functions
Federal State
1. External affairs 1. Muslim laws and custom
2. Defence 2. Land
3. Internal security 3. Agriculture and forestry
4. Local government 4. Civil and criminal law and the administration of justice
5. Federal citizenship & alien naturalization
6. Federal Government machinery
7. Finance
8. Trade, commerce and industry
5. Local public services: boarding
houses, burial grounds, pounds and
cattle trespass, markets and fairs,
licensing of theatres and cinemas
9. Shipping, navigation and fishery 6. State works and water
10. Communication and transport 7. State government machinery
11. Federal works and power 8. State holidays
12. Surveys, inquiries and research 9. Inquiries for State purpose
13. Education
14. Medicine and health
15. Labour and social security
16. Welfare of aborigines
10. Inquiries for State purpose
Creation of offence and indemnities
related to State matters
17. Professional licensing 11. Turtles and riverine fishery
18. Federal holidays; standard of time
19. Unincorporated societies Supplementary list for Sabah
20. Agricultural pest control and Sarawak
21. Publications 12. Native law and custom
22. Censorship
23. Theatres and cinemas
13. Incorporation of State authorities and
other bodies
24. Co-operative societies
25. Prevention of and extinguishing fires
14. Ports and harbours other than those
declared federal
15. Cadastral land surveys




Additional shared functions for Sabah
and Sarawak
17. Personal law 3. Protection of wild animals and birds; national parks
4. Animal husbandry
18. Adulteration of foodstuff and other
goods
5. Town and country planning 19. Shipping under fifteen tons
6. Vagrancy and itinerant hawkers 20. Water power
7. Public health
8. Drainage and irrigation
21. Agriculture and forestry research
22. Charities and charitable trusts 9. Rehabilitation of mining land and land which has
suffered soil erosion
10. Fire safety measures
23. Theatres, cinemas and places of
amusement
11. Culture and sports, housing
Source: Malaysia, Constitution of Malaysia – Ninth Schedule (Article 74, 77) on ‘Legislative
Lists’.10
To describe the NEP as Malaysia’s second ‘social contract’ implies some parity among
willing parties. Many non-Malays still complain that the NEP was imposed by a
dominant UMNO on the ethnic minorities against their will. With a dominant, though
unofficial ideology that has portrayed non-Malays as ‘immigrant sojourners’, exit –
through emigration or by bypassing the government – has been the main alternative to
resignation (‘loyalty’). Voice has largely been left to a few braver souls between four to
five yearly elections, when dissent can be secretly expressed at the ballot box, with little
real consequence in a heavily gerrymandered and controlled electoral system.
5 Malaysian federalism
The Malaysian Constitution defines federal-state relations, the division of authority
generally (Table 3) as well as over revenue sources (Table 4). Thus, the spirit and
constitution of the Malaysian Federation imply complementary and shared functions for
the Federal and State Governments. However, the expansion of the federation – and its
subsequent contraction with the secession of Singapore in August 1965 – was contested
from the outset1 (Poulgrain, 1998), with lingering consequences for the present.
6 Socio-economic conditions by state
In general, one would expect state GDP per capita to reflect relative development and
welfare by state (Table 5). At least since 1963, Kedah, Kelantan and Perlis have had
lower per capita GDP compared to the national average, while Selangor’s has been
higher. The less developed states of Sabah and Pahang saw their ratios worsening, while
the more developed states of Johor, Melaka, Negri Sembilan and Pulau Pinang
experienced improving ratios. The high and rising ratios for the less developed states of
Sarawak and Terengganu have been due to petroleum and related (gas) production in
these states, with limited trickle-down effects perpetuating high rates of poverty in both
states (Table 6). Meanwhile, the relative decline of Perak has been largely due to the
collapse of tin mining in the 1980s (Jomo, 1990) as well as its limited industrialization.
With petroleum output capped since the mid-1980s, and related production (petroleum
products, steel) levelling off soon after, GDP growth rates for Terengganu and Sarawak
have slowed down in recent years. Terengganu had achieved a growth rate of 7.8 per
cent per annum during 1971-90, i.e. the third highest state growth rate for the NEP’s
first Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) period. It had a growth rate of 8.0 per cent per
annum during 1991-95, before dropping by almost half during 1996-2000. As Malaysia
experienced its worst-ever post-war recession in 1998, Terengganu maintained sixth
position among the states. Meanwhile, Sarawak had a growth rate of 5.4 per cent – ninth
among the states – during the OPP era (1971-1990). The state’s performance was
relatively better in the 1990s, but its growth rate slowed down more than in most of the
rest of the country in the late 1990s. This slowdown coincided with the decline of
logging output as timber resources approached exhaustion (Table 7).
                                                
1 The Sultan of Kelantan, then a member State of the Federation of Malaya, filed a suit in High Court
against the Malaysia Act (Straits Times, 11 September 1963, cited in records of the Colonial Office).11
Table 4




  i. Income tax
   Individuals
   Companies
   Co-operatives
   Petroleum tax
   Development tax
 ii. Taxes on property and capital gains
   Real property gains tax
   Estate duty
2. Indirect taxes
  i. Taxes on international trade
   Export duties: palm oil, petroleum
   Import duties: tobacco, cigars and
   cigarettes, petroleum, motor vehicles,
   surtax on imports
 ii. Taxes on production and consumption
   Excise duties: heavy fuel oils,
   petroleum, spirits, motor vehicles
   Sales tax
   Service tax
iii. Others
   Stamp duties
   Gaming tax
   Betting and sweepstakes
   Lotteries
   Casino
   Pool betting duty




4. Fines and forfeitures
5. Interests
6. Contributions from foreign governments and
international agencies
7. Refund of expenditure
8. Receipts from other government agencies
9. Royalties
Tax revenue
1. Import and excise duties on
petroleum products and
export duties on timber and
other forest products for
Sabah and Sarawak, excise
duty on toddy for all States
2. Forests








water, gas, ports and
harbours
5. Receipts from land sales
6. Rents on State property
7. Zakat, fitrah and Bait-ul-Mal
and similar Islamic religious
revenues
8. Proceeds, dividend and
interests
9. Federal grants and
reimbursements
Source: Constitution of Malaysia.12
Table 5
Malaysia: ratios of per capita state GDPs to national averages, 1963-1975
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1975
Johor 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.96
Kedah 0.81 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.56
Kelantan 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.39
Melaka 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.70 0.69 0.79 0.69 0.81
N. Sembilan 1.30 1.06 1.11 1.18 1.14 1.14 1.16 1.16 0.92
Pahang 1.10 1.16 1.11 1.12 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.04 0.89
Perak 1.03 1.09 1.12 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.08 1.07 0.87
Perlis 0.70 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.84 0.91 0.85 0.80 0.56
P. Pinang 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.78 1.17
Sabah n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.18 1.22 1.21 1.25 1.12
Sarawak n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.87 0.93 0.92 0.99 0.80
Selangor** 1.53 1.56 1.47 1.48 1.56 1.52 1.49 1.49 1.88
Terengganu 0.69 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.52
(continued)
Table 5
Malaysia: ratios of per capita state GDPs to national averages, 1978-2000* (continuation)
1978 1980 1983 1985 1986 1988 1990 1995 1998 2000
Johor 0.94 0.59 0.96 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.96
Kedah 0.54 0.65 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.61
Kelantan 0.38 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.33 0.43
Melaka 0.73 0.71 0.83 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.82 1.05 0.97 1.08
N. Sembilan 0.88 1.07 1.03 1.02 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.93 0.88
Pahang 1.04 0.99 1.03 0.93 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.7 0.81 0.71
Perak 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.86 0.86 0.90
Perlis 0.54 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.74
P. Pinang 1.13 1.13 1.22 1.10 1.05 1.09 1.12 1.4 1.37 1.47
Sabah 1.31 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.06 1.06 1.02 0.67 0.53 0.63
Sarawak 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.82 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.88
Selangor** 1.84 1.43 1.41 1.32 1.42 1.47 1.49 1.32 1.43 1.19
Terengganu 0.60 1.15 0.87 1.26 1.62 1.54 1.62 1.54 1.63 1.58
* Ratios for 1963-1970 refer to ratio to the mean for Peninsular Malaysia
   GDP for 1983 in constant 1970 prices
   GDP values for 1975-88 in constant 1978 prices
   GDP values for 1990-2000 in constant 1987 prices
** Excludes Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur
Sources: Calculated with data from Malaysia Plan documents and population statistics from
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.13
Table 6
Malaysia: incidence of poverty (%) by state, 1970-1999
1970 1976 1984 1987 1990 1995 1997 1999
Johor 45.7 29.0 12.2 11.1 10.1 3.1 1.6 2.5
Kedah 61.1 61.1 36.3 31.3 30.0 12.2 11.5 13.5
Kelantan 74.1 67.1 39.2 31.6 29.9 22.9 19.5 18.7
Melaka 34.1 32.4 15.8 11.7 12.4 5.3 3.6 5.7
N. Sembilan 50.5 33.0 13.0 21.5 9.5 4.9 4.5 2.5
Perak 52.2 43.0 20.3 19.9 19.4 9.1 4.5 9.5
Perlis 63.2 59.8 33.7 29.1 17.2 11.8 10.6 13.3
Pahang 56.1 38.9 15.7 12.3 10.3 6.8 4.1 5.5
P. Pinang 52.7 32.4 13.4 12.9 8.0 4.0 1.6 2.7
Sabah - 58.3 33.1 35.3 34.4 22.4 22.1 20.1
Sarawak - 56.5 31.9 24.7 21.0 10.0 7.5 6.7
Selangor 42.7 22.9 8.6 8.9 7.8 2.2 1.3 2
Terengganu 65.1 60.3 28.9 36.1 31.2 24.3 17.3 14.9
Malaysia 56.7 37.7 20.7 19.3 17.1 8.7 6.8 7.5
* For Peninsular Malaysia only.
Sources: Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990 (5MP), Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan,
1986-1990 (MTR5MP), Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000 (OPP2), Mid-Term Review
of the Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000 (MTR7MP), Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005 (8MP).
Table 7
Malaysia: average GDP growth rate by state, 1971-2000 (% per annum)
1981-83 1971-1990 1991-95 1996-2000
Johor 5.4 (9a) 7.8 (3a) 10.0 (2a) 5.2 (3)
Kedah 4.4 (11) 6.9 (6) 9.9 (3) 4.8 (4)
Kelantan 5.4 (9b) 5.0 (11) 6.2 (9) 3.2 (10)
Melaka 6.2 (7) 7.0 (5) 9.6 (4) 3.9 (9a)
N. Sembilan 5.7 (8) 7.1 (4) 8.8 (5) 4.5 (5)
Pahang 7.3 (3) 5.3 (10) 7.5 (7a) 4.0 (8)
Perak 6.4 (6) 6.0 (8) 7.5 (7b) 3.9 (9b)
Perlis 5.1 (10) 6.7 (7) 7.0 (8) 3.9 (9c)
P. Pinang 6.9  (4) 8.0 (2) 10.0 (2b) 5.4 (2)
Sabah 7.7 (1) 4.9 (12) 5.0 (11) 4.1 (7)
Sarawak 6.8 (5) 5.4 (9) 6.0 (10) 4.2 (6a)
Selangor 5.4 (9c) 8.3 (1) 10.9 (1) 5.6 (1)
Terengganu 7.4 (2) 7.8 (3b) 8.0 (6) 4.2 (6b)
K. Lumpur 6.2 7.8 8.8 4.2
Malaysia 6.2 7.0 8.7 4.7
Sources:  Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985, Table 5-2; Seventh
Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000, Table 5-3; Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005, Table 5-4; Third
Outline Perspective Plan, 2001-2010, Table 4-10.14
In the Eighth Malaysia Plan for 2001-2005, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu,
Pahang, Sabah and Sarawak are categorized as less developed states, while Johor,
Melaka, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Pulau Pinang, Selangor and KL are considered more
developed. Using a national average development index base of 100 for 1990, the
development indices for the less developed states ranged from 86.8 to 98.8 in 1990 and
from 113.8 to 126.1 in 2000. The development indices for the more developed states
were higher, ranging from 100.0 to 109.9 in 1990 and from 131.9 to 139.2 in 2000.
Selangor and Pulau Pinang had the highest development index scores (Table 8).
The composite development index is constructed from an economic development index
and a social development index. The less developed states had lower economic index
ranges, i.e. 89.9 to 96.7 in 1990 and 100.6 to 117.1 to 125.0 in 2000, compared to 99.4
to 112.6 in 1990 and 129.7 to 142.1 in 2000 for the more developed states. Similarly,
the social development indices for less developed states were lower during the period
under review – 83.6 to 100.9 and 110.4 to 128.5 for the less developed states, compared
to 100.6 to 108.3 in 1990 and 132.5 to 140.6 in 2000 for the more developed states.
The ratio of the average development index for the more developed states to that for the
less developed states declined from 1.14 in 1990 to 1.10 in 2000. This suggests a
modest narrowing of the gap between the more developed and the less developed states
by four per cent in the decade under review. In fact, the average development index for
the less developed states increased by only slightly more than that for the more
developed states (29.2 per cent compared to 29.0 per cent). The ratio of the economic
development index for the more developed states to that for the less developed states
decreased slightly from 1.13 in 1990 to 1.11 in 2000 – i.e. narrowing the gap by a mere
two per cent. Similarly, the ratio for the social development indices narrowed by four
per cent from 1.13 to 1.09.
The incidence of poverty in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu has been highest among
the Malaysian states since 1976 (Figure 1), with Sabah, Sarawak and Perlis not far
behind. The poorest states seem to be characterized by greater persistence of subsistence
and rice agriculture. The incidence of poverty in Sabah has been unexpectedly high
since the 1980s. It is possible that massive immigration into the state – from the
southern Philippines as well as Indonesian outer islands – have served to depress wage
incomes, thus causing the state to sustain a relatively higher incidence of poverty
despite relatively high growth rates.
There is, of course, a strong relationship between the incidence of poverty and low state
GDP per capita, with the notable exceptions of the petroleum producing states of
Terengganu, Sarawak and Sabah, suggesting that oil wealth, including the royalties
accruing to the state governments (with the exception of Terengganu since 2000 after it
fell into opposition hands), have not been deployed to reduce poverty in those states.
Among the non-oil producing states, the relative positions of Kedah, Kelantan and
Selangor have remained rather unchanged for more than two decades. In the early
1980s, Kedah and Kelantan – now categorized as less developed states – were
categorized as low-income states. At that time, Selangor – now a more developed state –
was categorized as a high-income state (Malaysia 1981, Chapter 5).15
Table 8
Malaysia: development composite index by state, 1990, 2000 (1990 = 100)
More developed states







1990 104.4 97.0 100.1 94.9 95.1 106.4 114.4 120.6 Per capita GDP
2000 133.8 128.5 131.2 126.8 127.4 140.0 133.7 154.1
1990 106.2 108.0 104.6 106.6 102.2 107.6 110.0 104.2 Unemployment rate
2000 133.2 132.5 132.5 131.8 128.4 138.0 130.4 138.7
1990 106.5 100.0 95.7 97.2 102.7 112.7 112.8 124.5 Urbanization rate
2000 135.9 129.1 126.0 125.0 134.4 142.9 144.4 149.3
1990 108.2 108.3 104.8 105.3 99.3 117.8 113.7 108.2 Registered cars &
motorcycles* 2000 139.9 136.8 138.2 134.9 134.2 148.7 130.3 156.1
1990 106.6 101.2 99.0 99.7 97.9 108.6 113.3 126.4 Telephones*
2000 134.2 130.9 130.7 129.9 130.5 140.8 147.8 128.8
1990 107.2 107.3 105.1 107.9 98.3 108.5 109.6 113.5 Incidence of poverty*
2000 130.3 132.5 127.5 132.5 121.6 132.2 133.3 132.8
1990 108.1 101.2 108.7 105.5 104.1 112.6 110.4 114.2 Piped water*
2000 142.2 141.1 142.0 142.0 142.9 142.9 142.0 142.9
1990 105.0 99.1 107.6 106.8 99.1 106.8 107.6 107.6 Electricity*
2000 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9
1990 106.0 102.5 107.1 104.3 103.4 108.9 105.9 109.7 Infant mortality rate per
1000 live births 2000 133.4 139.2 125.2 134.0 138.2 136.6 144.4 116.4
1990 105.0 97.4 99.2 100.0 98.3 104.7 101.9 132.9 Doctors per 10,000
population 2000 133.4 122.6 132.1 126.0 126.3 133.9 147.4 145.5
1990 106.3 102.9 100.8 100.7 99.4 110.6 112.6 116.8 Economic development
index 2000 135.5 131.6 131.7 129.7 131.0 142.1 137.3 145.5
1990 106.2 101.6 105.5 104.9 100.6 108.3 107.01 115.6 Social development
index 2000 135.1 134.3 132.5 134.1 133.0 136.3 140.6 134.7
1990 106.3 102.2 103.2 102.8 100.0 109.5 109.9 116.2 Development composite
index 2000 135.3 132.9 132.1 131.9 132.0 139.2 139.0 140.1
Change in index 29.0 30.7 28.9 29.1 31.9 29.7 29.1 23.9
(Continued)16
Table 8
Malaysia: development composite index by state, 1990 and 2000 (1990 = 100) (continuation)
Less developed states
Indicator Year
Total Kedah Kelantan Pahang Perlis Sabah Sarawak Terengganu
1990 94.6 88.3 84.3 94.2 90.1 96.3 99.2 108.2 Per capita GDP
2000 123.9 120.9 116.8 123.1 123.7 121.2 126.7 142.3
1990 93.8 102.2 95.4 108.0 101.7 79.9 80.9 88.6 Unemployment rate
2000 118.8 131.1 112.5 124.2 128.4 108.3 111.8 115.2
1990 93.5 92.8 93.2 91.8 90.0 93.1 95.2 98.4 Urbanization rate
2000 121.8 122.5 121.2 118.6 119.4 120.7 126.4 124.1
1990 91.8 94.5 89.5 96.3 98.1 84.4 91.0 88.9 Registered cars &
motorcycles* 2000 125.4 127.9 123.8 127.8 128.5 119.6 125.6 124.2
1990 93.4 92.0 89.6 93.2 94.7 95.9 96.9 91.6 Telephones*
2000 117.8 115.9 115.4 122.4 115.9 115.9 120.1 119.0
1990 92.8 87.8 87.9 107.1 100.3 83.5 96.6 86.5 Incidence of poverty*
2000 115.7 115.3 107.2 127.8 115.7 105.1 125.9 113.2
1990 91.9 94.5 79.8 98.7 92.3 93.0 87.9 97.2 Piped water*
2000 131.2 141.1 115.6 136.5 138.3 111.9 137.4 137.4
1990 95.0 100.9 95.0 103.8 106.8 77.2 79.5 102.1 Electricity*
2000 128.1 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 107.7 109.1 135.9
1990 94.0 100.8 103.1 98.7 97.1 71.2 87.6 99.9 Infant mortality rate per
1000 live births 2000 125.1 128.8 122.6 1210 131.3 113.3 140.8 117.9
1990 95.0 94.7 95.3 96.1 97.2 93.3 93.6 95.0 Doctors per 10,000
population 2000 119.4 121.1 122.6 119.9 121.1 114.1 118.0 119.0
1990 93.4 93.9 90.4 96.7 94.9 89.9 92.6 95.2 Economic development
index 2000 121.7 123.7 117.9 123.2 123.2 117.1 122.1 125.0
1990 93.8 95.7 92.2 100.9 98.7 83.6 89.0 96.1 Social development
index 2000 123.9 128.5 120.8 128.2 128.5 110.4 126.2 124.7
1990 93.6 94.8 91.3 98.8 96.8 86.8 90.8 95.7 Development composite
index 2000 122.8 126.1 119.4 125.7 125.8 113.8 124.2 124.8
Change in index 29.2 31.2 28.1 26.7 29.0 27.0 33.3 29.2
Source: Third Outline Perspective Plan, 2001-2010, Table 4-8.
Note: * per 1000 population.17
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The poverty rates in Sabah and Sarawak have been higher than the average in the
peninsula,2 though Sabah and Sarawak had higher growth rates than the peninsula during
the 1971-90 period. In fact, Sabah had the highest growth rate of all the States (Wee,
1995: 56-58). The growth rates of the Borneo States were boosted in part by the
production of petroleum, the benefits of which have mainly accrued to foreign production
companies and the Federal Government since the Petroleum Development Act of 1974.
The last decade saw Malaysia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growing at an average 8.7
per cent per annum for 1991-1995 and by 8.0 per cent for 1996-2000 despite the deep
national recession in 1998. Meanwhile, Kelantan, Sabah and Sarawak grew slower than
the other States in the 1990s (Figure 2). Together with the northern States of Kedah and
Perlis, they have had consistently lower per capita GDPs compared to the national
average (Figure 3). The decline in Sabah’s growth rate to lag behind the peninsula can be
attributed to declining natural resource extraction, especially of timber.
The Northern and East Coast States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu have also
had relatively low household incomes (Figure 4). Although household incomes for the
Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak have been comparable with most other States, the
costs of living in the Borneo States have been much higher, requiring higher poverty lines
than in the peninsula. Poverty has also been reflected in their higher infant mortality rates
and fewer motorcycles, motorcars and telephone services per capita (Table 9).
                                                
2 Some predominantly Malay States in northern Peninsular Malaysia and on its East Coast also have high
poverty rates, while there are also pockets of poverty in the more developed States, especially among
urban squatters and Orang Asli communities.26
Table 9









Johor 1865 (8) 6 (7a) 3 (6a) 6 (7a)
Kedah 1882 (7) 13 (3) 5 (5) 7 (6a)
Kelantan 2099 (5) 16 (2a) 7 (3a) 13 (2)
Melaka 1242 (12) 5 (8) 3 (6b) 5 (8a)
N. Sembilan 1505 (10) 6 (7b) 3 (6c) 5 (8b)
Pahang 2300 (4) 10 (4) 6 (4a) 9 (5)
Perak 1498 (11) 7 (6) 3 (6d) 6 (7b)
Perlis 1895 (6) 29 (1) 8 (2a) 7 (6b)
P. Pinang 1061 (13) 4 (9) 2 (7) 5 (8c)
Sabah 4249 (1) 16 (2b) 42 (1) 19 (1)
Sarawak 2585 (2) 9 (5) 7 (3b) 11 (3)
Selangor 1584 (9) 6 (7c) 6 (4b) 4* (9)
Trengganu 2467 (3) 16 (2c) 8 (2b) 10 (4)
Malaysia 1477 8 5 7
# No. of deaths of infants less than 1 year old per 1000 live births, for 1998.
* Excludes Multi-media Super-corridor (MSC).
Note: Figures in parentheses show ranks.
Sources: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Social Bulletin of Statistics, 2000. Calculated from
data in Department of Statistics, Malaysia, State/District Data Bank, 1999.27
Table 10
Malaysia: federal and consolidated state government revenues and expenditures, 1985-1999 (RM '000 million)
1985 1990 1995 1999
Federal Government Revenue 21.114 29.521 50.954 58.675
Consolidated State Government Revenue 4.245 6.718 8.261 8.228
Federal Government Expenditure 26.82 34.19 49.03 68.162
Consolidated State Government Expenditure 5.61 8.54 10.534 8.91
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various issues.
Table 11
Malaysia: grants to State governments, 1975-1999
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Grants to State Governments (% Federal Government Operating Expenditure) 9.0 11.0 4.5 3.8 3.5*
Deficit grants (RM million) 27.50 13.56 17.11
Development grants (RM million) 99.60 166.39 165.93
Contingency grants (RM million) 262.50 797.80 1216.60 1021.80
Outstanding Loans Due to Federal Govt from State Govts (RM million) 1107 2461 6118 7317 7330 9335*
* 2000 estimate
Sources: Economic Report, various issues; Federal Public Accounts, various issues.28
7 Federal and state government finances
Under the Malaysian Constitution, taxes may only be levied with authorization by
federal law. The Federal Government collects direct taxes such as income taxes on
individuals, companies and cooperatives, as well as capital gains taxes, import and
export duties. The State Governments are assigned residual revenues such as those
related to land, real property, agriculture and forestry. Within constitutionally set limits,
the Federal Government can influence such State government revenue sources.
For instance, the federal-owned Petroleum Nasional Berhad (Petronas) is empowered to
contract out exploration and production of petroleum under the Petroleum Act, 1974. If
the Federal Government directs – through Petronas – such activities away from a
particular State during a certain period, the State Government concerned will have less
royalty revenue in that period. The 1991 federal ban on log exports from Sabah – then
held by the opposition PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah) government – undermined State
government revenue (Wee, 1995: 24).
In essence, the State’s financial powers are limited. State Governments receive grants
from the Federal Government, given in consultation with the National Finance Council,
which comprises the Prime Minister and ministers appointed by the Prime Minister and
one representative from each State (Constitution of Malaysia, Article 108). Since the
Prime Minister can appoint various ministers to the Council, he has much more power
than any State representative. Current Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has been the
most powerful and assertive among the four Malaysian prime ministers to date.
Grants to the States take the form of tax-sharing grants,3 general grants4 and specific
grants.5 Federal Government expenditure has been far larger than for all the State
Governments taken together (Table 10). Federal government revenue has contributed
from between 77 to 91 per cent of total government revenue since 1963. Federal
                                                
3 Tax-sharing grants include 10 per cent of export duties on tin, iron and other minerals based on the
‘derivation’ principle. Under Article 110 (3A), the Federal Constitution allows the Federal
Government to increase this grant for the peninsular States to more than the minimum 10 per cent of
export duties on minerals. This tax-sharing grant was created at the same time that State royalty rights
to minerals were prohibited unless provided for by federal law. If export duties are abolished in line
with World Trade Organization (WTO) proposals, State Government revenue from such tax-sharing
grants will be reduced.
4 General grants include capitation grants, State Reserve Fund grants, Contingencies Fund grants, State
Advance grants and special grants. The capitation grants are based on a State’s population size. State
Reserve Fund grants are for supplementing State Government revenues (deficit grants) and for
development (development grants) as deemed necessary for the year. The Contingencies Fund grants
are given for unforeseen needs. The State Advance Fund grants provide cash advances to State
Governments facing cash flow problems.
5 Special grants have been given to the Governments of Kedah, Selangor, Sabah and Sarawak. These
grants may be seen as compensation for land surrendered by the respective State Governments to the
Federal Government. The grants to Sabah and Sarawak were given on the basis of the conditions for
incorporation into Malaysia that were supposedly subject to later review, which has never taken place.
Currently, RM26.7 million goes to Sabah and RM16 million to Sarawak. Specific grants to the State
Governments include State road grants, service charge grants and cost reimbursement grants. Thus,
the State Government may be regarded as the implementing agency, whose services are subject to
federal decisions.29
government operating expenditure made up more than 70 per cent of total government
operating expenditure for the period 1963-80, more than 50 per cent in the 1980s, and
about 40 per cent in the 1990s. The period also saw higher federal current account
surpluses as well as higher overall federal deficits.
Meanwhile, federal development expenditure constituted 68 to 90 per cent of total
development expenditure during the period under review. For the period 1985-99,
federal government expenditure was at least four and a half times the consolidated State
government expenditure. It increased to more than five times in 1995, and to about
seven and a half times in 19996. Similarly, federal government revenue has exceeded
consolidated State government revenues. Federal government revenue grew from four
times the consolidated State government revenues to seven times in the period under
review.7
Federal Government financial allocations to State Governments have shifted from
grants to loans over time. Federal Government grants to the States decreased from 9.0
per cent of its operating budget in 1975 to 3.5 per cent in 1999 (Table 11). At the same
time, outstanding loans from the Federal Government to the State Governments
increased from RM1,107 million to over RM9,000 million. In general, deficit grants
allocated from the State Reserve Fund to the State Governments declined from the late
1980s to the early 1990s, but have risen again recently, especially since the Asian
financial crisis of 1997.
Besides special grants, federal grants contribute proportionately more to State
government revenue in Selangor, Kedah, Johor, Pulau Pinang, Negri Sembilan and
Kelantan.8 Because of their limited financial resources, State Governments have
                                                
6 In 1999, federal government expenditure was estimated at RM68,187 million, compared to RM8,912
million for consolidated State government expenditure.
7 In 1999, federal government revenue was estimated at RM58,675 million, compared to the
consolidated State government revenues of RM8,228 million.
8 With the exception of Pulau Pinang, these States as well as Sarawak and Pahang had the most federal
loans for 1996-99 (see table below). Except for Kelantan, most of the loans were for housing and
water supply. Forty-five per cent of outstanding loans to Kelantan in 1999 were for its State Economic
Development Corporation. These consisted of two rescheduled loans given in 1997. The loans were
probably rescheduled because the Kelantan State Government was unable to pay as originally
scheduled. The Federal Government is also guarantor for two statutory bodies each in Sabah and
Sarawak, as well as a statutory body in Pahang – RM169.2 million for the Sabah Electricity Board,
RM8 million for the Sabah Ports Authority, RM424.1 million for the Sarawak Electricity Supply
Corporation, RM2 million for the Sibu Water Board and RM32.4 million for the Pahang State
Development Authority in 1996.
Malaysia: Outstanding Federal Loans to State Governments, 1996, 1998, 1999 (RM million)
State 1996 1998 1999
Johor 821 961 944
Kedah 1168 1257 1315
Kelantan 678 636 639
Melaka 372 503 574
Negeri Sembilan 678 859 992
Pahang 642 751 829
Perak 193 190 183
Perlis 120 122 175
Pulau Pinang 197 309 312
Sabah 140 231 456
Sarawak 790 862 1124
Selangor 1147 1084 1039
Trengganu 553 746 751
Sources: Federal Public Accounts, various issues.30
attempted to reduce their fiscal gaps by cutting spending in line with their revenues
(Umikalsum, 1992: 327) and handing over some functions to the Federal Government,
leading to further centralization since the formation of Malaysia (Wee, 1996: 285).
Spending has been uneven among the states, reflecting federal government preferences
as well as state government financial resources. The public sector was smallest in the
Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak, contributing the lowest shares of state GDPs
during the NEP era. Public sector shares of state GDPs in the northern states of Perlis,
Kedah, Pulau Pinang and Perak were relatively small in the early 1970s, but grew in the
1980s. The reverse was observed for Selangor, while Melaka’s relatively large public
sector share was maintained during this period (Table 12).
As noted earlier, the federal government has been fiscally much more important than the
13 state governments put together. With its greater financial resources, there has been
greater attention to federal government efforts in reducing inter-regional welfare
differences and ensuring more equitable development. Malaysia has had eight five-year
development plans since 1966. More development funds have been channelled to
Selangor and Johore, both absolutely and relatively (Figures 5 and 6). The smaller
States of Melaka, Pulau Pinang and Perlis have been allocated the most development
funds in relation to area. Conversely, the larger States of Pahang, Sabah and Sarawak
have received the lowest allocations in relation to area.
The Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) saw relatively higher allocations for the poor
States of Sabah and Sarawak. Besides Pahang, the poor State of Terengganu also got the
most allocations per capita (Figure 7). However, Terengganu’s allocations have been
reduced relatively after electing a PAS government in late 1999. The poorest State in
the peninsula, Kelantan, has long experienced such discrimination since electing PAS
State governments from 1959 until 1978, and then again from 1990. Since the Federal
Government is in a better position to finance development, discrimination against these
two States has aggravated tensions between them and the Federal Government.
More government development allocations have been allocated for economic, rather
than social development (Figure 8). Economic development programmes here include
agricultural development, mineral resources development, commercial and industrial
development, development of transport, communications, energy and water resources,
and related feasibility studies as well as research and development to increase incomes.
Social development programmes include provision of piped water supply, electricity,
housing, sewerage and rubbish disposal, health services, roads or transport systems. The
poor generally have less access to piped water supply and electricity than higher income
groups. Among the urban poor, housing as well as sewerage and rubbish disposal
services are relatively inaccessible.31
Table 12
Malaysia: Government services as proportion of gross domestic product in purchasers’ prices by State, 1970-90
1970 1971 1975 1980 1983 1985 1986 1988 1990
Johor 7.49 (5) 10.98 (6) 7.05 (6) 9.57 (6) 11.94 (4) 11.72 (5) 11.65 (6) 12.52 (6) 10.36 (6)
Kedah 6.20 (4a) 10.14 (5a) 6.72 (5a) 11.85 (10) 19.26 (11) 15.34 (10) 16.11 (11) 16.48 (10) 15.02 (10)
Kelantan 8.62 (7) 12.59 (7) 9.16 (9) 16.45 (13) 22.64 (13) 20.38 (13) 24.82 (13) 24.65 (13) 22.26 (13)
Melaka 11.03 (11) 17.96 (12) 10.65 (11) 14.37 (11) 16.79 (10) 17.55 (11) 15.47 (9) 16.51 (11) 13.67 (8)
N. Sembilan 8.86 (8) 13.55 (10) 8.31 (7) 9.79 (8) 13.54 (6) 12.60 (8) 14.81 (8) 15.52 (8) 13.90 (9)
Pahang 8.98 (9) 12.83 (8) 9.17 (10) 10.73 (9) 13.09 (5) 13.09 (9) 16.09 (10) 16.25 (9) 15.41 (11)
Perak 4.28 (1) 7.85 (2) 4.36 (1) 9.75 (7) 13.83 (8) 12.25 (7) 13.95 (7) 14.30 (7) 12.71 (7)
Perlis 6.20 (4b) 10.14 (5b) 6.72 (5b) 14.54 (12) 21.67 (12) 17.67 (12) 20.03 (12) 21.13 (12) 17.46 (12)
P. Pinang 5.19 (2a) 7.29 (1) 6.27 (4) 9.21 (4) 10.68 (3) 12.00 (6) 11.24 (5) 12.22 (5) 9.84 (5)
Sabah 5.19 (2b) 9.83 (4) 5.80 (3) 9.56 (5) 10.15 (2) 8.73 (2) 7.44 (1) 7.94 (1) 8.07 (4)
Sarawak 5.23 (3) 9.78 (3) 5.22 (2) 6.77 (1) 13.71 (7) 10.08 (4) 8.62 (4) 8.68 (4) 6.41 (1)
Selangor 10.26 (10) 13.30 (9) 11.10 (12) 7.85 (2) 7.71(1) 8.38 (1) 7.47 (2) 8.28 (3) 6.86 (3)
Terengganu 8.51 (6) 14.18 (11) 8.63 (8) 7.95 (3) 14.55 (9) 9.45 (3) 8.42 (3) 8.16 (2) 6.75 (2)
Kuala Lumpur n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.78 18.27 16.43 16.26 17.58 15.42
n.a. - Not available
Figures in brackets indicate ranks from highest to lowest proportions.
Sources: Calculated with data from Third Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Table 10-1 and 10-3; Fourth Malaysia Plan, Table 5-1; Mid-Term Review of the Fourth
Malaysia Plan, Tables 5-1 and 5-3; Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990, Tables 5-2, 5-3; Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000, Tables 4-6, 13.32
In 1990, government spending on health came to three per cent of the gross domestic
product (Economic Planning Unit, 1995, cited in Low et al., 1996), well below the five
per cent recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). In 1998, government
operating expenditure through the Ministry of Health represented about 1.2 per cent of
the gross domestic product (calculated from information in Federal Public Accounts,
1999 and from Ministry of Finance statistics). It is generally acknowledged that the
Malaysian Government has provided reasonably good health services and that the cost
of coverage has been kept reasonably low through the efficient use of resources.
However, the distribution of health service delivery has been regionally inequitable. Of
particular concern has been the relative lack of health personnel in Sabah, Sarawak,
Terengganu, Kedah and Kelantan (Table 13). Skilled personnel, including doctors,
would rather stay in the more developed States, where modern facilities as well as
recreational and entertainment services are closer to their expectations. However,
improved community health may not be seen as developmental or improving incomes.9
The development of road transport can be very important for improving the quality of
life and incomes. Better road networks have lowered transport costs and increased
marketing opportunities nationwide. In Sarawak, roads linking rural communities to
health centres also increase access to health services. With the exceptions of Selangor
and Johor, which have higher road densities relative to size, large States tend to have
lower road densities. In fact, the Kelang Valley in Selangor is currently burdened by
traffic congestion. In contrast, Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan have lower road density
relative to size.
Educational opportunities and scholarships have been politicized. Education has been
and is perceived as a means to increase chances of participation in high-income
employment. Most government educational opportunities and scholarships are reserved
for Bumiputeras under the NEP. However, the ethnic quota system has failed to
privilege the poor among the Bumiputeras. The siting of universities in various States
has been similarly politicized. Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (Unimas) was set up when a
Sarawakian was the federal Minister of Education. Some Sarawakians welcomed siting
the university in the State, but many more still bemoan the low proportion of
Sarawakian students in the university and the teachers’ training colleges in the State.
Besides politicising development allocations and depriving States controlled by the
opposition, the location of economic development projects and programmes have also
been politicized to marginalize those States led by opposition governments. The
consequence of such bias is to further increase the disparities as opposition parties have
been strongest in States characterized by poverty, fiscal discrimination and slower
economic growth if not for natural resources – especially petroleum and timber –
extraction activities.
                                                
9 The opportunity cost of poor health in terms of increased medical care requirements is not obvious.
Politicians find it easier to win over voters through projects with more apparent direct benefits.33
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Johor 1,808 (7) 1,228 (4) 1,001 (3) 12,538 (9) 0.341514 (7)
Kedah 1,915 (6) 1,173 (7) 771 (7) 17,360 (3) 0.427010  (6)
Kelantan 1,962 (5) 1,357 (5) 943 (4) 16,727 (5) 0.189745 (11)
Melaka 1,111 (12) 939 (10) 710 (8) 10,785 (10) 0.837674 (3)
Negri Sembilan 1,455 (10) 932 (11) 630 (10) 9,958 (11) 0.577299 (5)
Pahang 2,110 (4) 1,087 (8) 787 (6) 14,676 (7) 0.190718 (10)
Perak 1,483 (9) 996 (9) 615 (12) 14,409 (8) 0.290978 (9)
Perlis 1,701 (8) 873 (13) 560 (13) 16,175 (6) 0.777358 (4)
Pulau Pinang 1,063 (13) 923 (12) 620 (11) 8,906 (13) 1.979611 (1)
Sabah 4,015 (1) 1,788 (2) 1,073 (2) 40,207 (1) 0.147244 (12)
Sarawak 2,629 (2) 1,544 (3) 676 (9) 25,659 (2) 0.041125 (13)
Selangor 1,431 (11) 2,609 (1) 1,261 (1) 9,085 (12) 1.087115 (2)
Trengganu 2,194 (3) 1,195 (6) 874 (5) 17,225 (4) 0.308529  (8)
Malaysia 1,465 1,223 806 11,897 0.195076
Note: Figures in parentheses show ranking.
Sources: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Social Bulletin of Statistics, 2000.
               Calculated from data in Department of Statistics, Malaysia, State/District Data Bank, 1999.
               Handbook of Statistics, Malaysia, 1999.34
Table 14
Malaysia: Government revenue, 1975-2001 (RM million)
1975 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990 1996 2001
Federal government:
Petroleum income tax 322 771 1,736 2,075 1,998 2,570 3,130 2,644 2,203 9,858
Petroleum royalty 78 116 345 425 491 581 619 627 848 2,000
Total 400 887 2,081 2,500 2,489 3,151 3,749 3,271 3,051 11,858
% Total federal government revenue 7.82 10.03 14.94 14.98 13.38 15.15 17.76 11.08 5.24 14.90
Sabah 0.85 50.74 74.98 87.71 118.84 104.55 104.32 115.37 80.47 N.A.
% State government revenue 0.32 6.53 4.87 5.92 9.03 7.82 9.02 7.12 5.28
Sarawak 112.35* 64.50* 116.00* 159.93* 171.71* 216.70* 210.66* 204.90 320.00 N.A.
% State government revenue 54.44* 27.01* 29.00 23.18* 17.36* 24.63* 22.41* 22.00 14.00
Terengganu - 13.20 0 181.94 0 0 280.92 0 0 N.A.
% State government revenue 22.37 0.70 83.07
* Refers to revenue from land and mines, the majority of which is from crude oil and natural gas.
2001: forecast only.
Sources: Calculated with data from State Financial Statements, various issues.
               Economic Report, various issues.
               http://www.bnm.gov.my (Bank Negara Malaysia).35
The (usually federal) government-financed development of industrial infrastructure is
generally expected to bring in employment-generating foreign investments. However,
even without bias or neglect, it is often the case that poorer States and regions are more
likely to be bypassed for cost, feasibility or viability considerations, leading to lower
allocations to poorer States. Certain States may also lack the skilled human resources or
other capabilities required for implementing some development projects. Limited
capacities and capabilities are still common, and some development allocations have not
been spent for such reasons.
8 Tensions between the centre and the Borneo States
Since the mid-1970s, petroleum resources have been managed by the federal
government-owned Petronas.10 The issue of increasing petroleum royalties for
producing States has often been raised.11 Based on the principle of ownership of the
continental shelf by adjoining regions, Sabah and Sarawak could claim ownership
before incorporation into Malaysia in 1963. The status quo could have been maintained
insofar as the Malaysian Constitution is silent on the matter. Thus, the federal
government claim to ownership has been construed as annexation.12
The Federal Government gets far more petroleum revenue than the governments of the
petroleum producing States (Table 14). Besides getting the same five per cent royalties
from petroleum output as the State government concerned, the Federal Government gets
dividends from Petronas. Furthermore, it also taxes the profits of the oil producing-
companies and Petronas itself. Since 1985, Federal Government revenue from
petroleum tax and royalties have totalled more than RM3,000 million per annum,
                                                
10 Distribution of the gross value of petroleum output has been prescribed by the 1974 Petroleum
Development Act as follows (Wee, 1995: 24-25):
Government of producing-State  5% royalty on the gross value of petroleum output
Federal Government  5% royalty on the gross value of petroleum output
Producer-company 20% for cost recovery
Total 30%
Producer-company 21% (30% of remaining 70%)
Petronas  49% (70% of remaining 70%)
Total 100%
11 For instance, in 1969, the Sarawak Chief Minister claimed that the federal government had orally
assured Sarawak that it could have all the revenue from offshore petroleum in return for a lower grant
(Leigh, 1988: 133). During the election campaign of October 1990, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, the
incumbent Chief Minister of Sabah, argued that the petroleum royalty rate for the State should be
increased from 5 to 50 per cent.
The issue of Sarawak ownership of offshore petroleum was especially mentioned in the 1960s.
Although petroleum royalties in general have long been an issue of contention, there has been little
publicity on the matter in the Malaysian media. Members of Parliament from Sarawak have inquired
about the value of petroleum royalties due to the State at various points in time. However, disputes on
the formula for sharing petroleum revenues have never been well reported, reflecting the federal
government’s sensitivity to the matter and tight control of the mass media. The mention of benefits
from petroleum resources – in the form of profits to government-owned shipping facilities now
privatized and owned by Sarawakians – hint of public opinion in the Borneo States being critical of
the matter (Abang Karim, 1999).
12 See Bob Reece in Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1969 and 12 March 1970, quoted in
Leigh, 1971: 233.36
representing at least five per cent of total revenue. It is estimated that at least half this
revenue is from petroleum resources in the Borneo States.13
Both Sabah and Sarawak seemingly enjoy favoured financial positions among the
Malaysian States (Table 15). They receive more grants compared to other States, partly
rationalized by being among the three founding members of the federation. However,
over time, the grants negotiated at the time of formation of the Malaysian federation
have been abolished and/or reduced.14
Table 15
Malaysia: Federal Government grants by State, 1964-1996 (RM million)
State 1964-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-1996
Johor 80.77 182.37 350.04 423.46
Kedah 75.79 157.74 439.38 353.56
Kelantan 50.48 110.86 256.60 227.07 (8)
Melaka 34.36 72.31 128.45 (4) 85.23 (9)
N. Sembilan 42.38 99.21 199.87 101.13 (10)
Pahang 52.54 136.50 539.69 (5) 189.83 (11)
Perak 137.24 282.72 (1) 221.38 (6) n.a.
Perlis 8.31 20.12 (2) n.a. 59.55 (12)
P. Pinang 42.86 44.84 (3) n.a. n.a.
Sabah 267.20 421.11 885.78 585.23
Sarawak 312.00 525 1,098.31 746.719
Selangor 11,753,216.00 840.42 3005.25 (5) n.a.
Terengganu 11,643,013.00 106.82 245.65 (7) 214.01
(1)  For 1971-79
(2)  For 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-78
(3)  For 1973, 1975-77
(4)  For 1981-89
(5)  For 1981-85, 1987-89
(6)  For 1981, 1983-86
(7)  For 1981-87, 1989, 1990
(8)  For 1991-95




Sources: Various State Financial Statements.
The export ban on logs from Sabah has been another point of contention between the
Sabah State Government and the Federal Government. The federal Minister of Primary
Industries, with whom some powers over timber policy have been vested, banned log
                                                
13 Crude petroleum exports constituted at least half of petroleum production in the mid-1990s, and
exports from Sabah represented a fifth of exports, while those from Sarawak represented some 30 to
40 per cent (calculated with data from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia). However, Sabah’s
highest ever petroleum royalty was RM161 million, or 9.9 per cent of total government revenue in
1990. Sarawak’s petroleum royalty was about RM200 million for the period, 1985-1998. The
contribution of petroleum royalties to Sarawak State Government coffers decreased from 21.8 per cent
in 1985 to 8.7 per cent in 1998.
14 There should have been reviews of the grants in 1973 and in subsequent decades, but no such review
has been completed. It is anticipated that Sarawak and Sabah will lose their favoured financial
positions within the Malaysian Federation over time. In a Sarawak State Government Assembly sitting
in 2000, the need to review the escalating grant from the Federal Government to the State – per
Article 112D of the Federal Constitution – was raised.37
exports from the State in 1992. The ostensible reason for the ban was to encourage the
growth of wood-based industries in Sabah, though it is widely attributed to the Sabah
ruling party’s post-nomination, pre-election defection to the opposition in late 1990.
The Sabah Chief Minister unsuccessfully argued that the ban was only acceptable with
compensation from the federal government for the State’s anticipated revenue loss. The
federal Minister had initially stated that the State would be compensated. He later
claimed that the federal government was not in a position to do so, after the ruling party
in Sabah had defected to the opposition (Wee, 1995: 22, 24).
In negotiations before the formation of Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak politicians had
insisted on Borneo-ization, i.e. staffing state civil services with Sabahans and
Sarawakians respectively, as a condition for joining the federation. Many in Sabah and
Sarawak still do not welcome the federal employees from the peninsular States, who are
said to resent being sent there, to patronize the ‘locals’ or to take time to adjust to life in
the two States. Relations between Malaysians from the peninsula and ‘locals’ in the
Borneo States have, however, improved over the years. Nevertheless, social and
economic difficulties, e.g. perceived higher rates of graduate unemployment, can
threaten such relations, as in the past.
Although Sarawak was far more important historically in developing a sense of
nationalism, these movements were largely co-opted in the 1970s, when the Sarawak
United People’s Party (SUPP) and then the Sarawak National Action Party (SNAP)
joined the ruling coalition. In contrast, Sabah’s status was rendered ambiguous by
Filipino claims to territory once associated with the Sulu Sultanate. However, in recent
decades, tensions between the centre and the Sabah State Government have been greater
than those between the centre and the Sarawak State Government. Suggestions of
secession have surfaced during periods of tension.
The mid-1970s saw the federal government oust the Mustapha government in favour of
Berjaya. Tensions between the centre and Sabah rose again in the mid-1980s after Parti
Bersatu Sabah (PBS) defeated the incumbent Berjaya with strong support from the
Kadazandusun and ethnic Chinese communities. However, the PBS joined the ruling
coalition, in which it felt discriminated against. After the PBS defected to the opposition
during the 1990 general elections, federal government discrimination against the PBS
state government – and the state – became more pronounced. However, this was
reversed when the national ruling coalition recaptured the state in 1994 by engineering
defections from the PBS after it narrowly won the state election. Support for the PBS
has since declined, and the leadership rejoined the ruling coalition in early 2002.
Before the 1990s, peninsula-based political parties did not operate in the Borneo States.
After the heightened tensions between Sabah and the Federal Government in the 1980s
culminated in Sabah’s ruling party, PBS, defecting to the opposition just before the
1990 federal parliamentary elections, peninsular-based political parties began operating
in the State to undermine the PBS. The United Malays National Organization (UMNO),
the most powerful party in the ruling national coalition, spread its wings to Sabah, even
accepting non-Muslim Bumiputera members. After UMNO’s entry into and take-over
of the State in 1994, a two-year rotating chief ministership replaced the previously
renewable full term chief ministership, still practiced in the other States. Sabah has38
Table 16
Sabah and Sarawak: net transfers of revenue from federal Government, 1966-1989 (RM million)
Sabah Sarawak
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-88 1964-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-89
Federal allocations 299 350 363 1,732 382 72 240 225 300 543 491
Federal expenditure 1,140 2,284 3,741 9,283 4,159 209 614 1,190 1,815 6,139 4,741
Total 1,439 2,634 4,104 11,015 4,541 281 854 1,415 2,115 6,682 5,232
Federal revenue 655 1,152 4,922 9,415 2,195 130 441 692 1,906 5,346 3,741
Petroleum royalty - 1 168 496 219 - - 109 355 940 547
Petroleum dividend* - - - 932* 751 - - - - 2,048* 2,474
Petroleum tax* - - 845 1,894 1,023 - - - 584 646 1,942
Total 655 1,153 5,935 12,737 4,188 130 441 801 2,845 8,980 8,704
% total federal revenue 7% 6% 13% 14% 6% 5% 4% 4% 6% 10% 10%
Net transfer 784 1,481 -1,831 -1,722 353 151 413 614 -730 -2,298 -3,472
* Petroleum dividend for the period 1983-85.
Source: Wee, 1995: Table 2.17.39
since had two Muslim Chief Ministers, two Chinese Chief Ministers15 and one Kadazan
Chief Minister who did not even finish his two-year term after losing in the 1999 State
elections.
This happened in spite of lower net transfers out of Sabah – compared to Sarawak – to
the peninsula (Table 16). This may be due to poorer economic conditions in Sabah
relative to Sarawak. Federal domination has been consolidated since the mid-1990s with
federal patronage of a Muslim-Chinese elite alliance, not unlike the one that emerged in
Sarawak in the 1970s – and was consolidated in the 1980s – that has also marginalized
non-Muslim Bumiputeras.
Sarawak’s relatively large area, lower population density, huge rural constituency
areas,16 and State-level rivalries among its politicians have limited effective challenges
from the State to the Federal Government. Citizens’ protests have mainly been in the
rural areas, where politically affiliated logging companies are active, and timber
concessionaires threaten ‘native’ communities’ claims to the forests for their
livelihoods. Forests are a State matter, and hence, the protests have been directed at the
State government. However, State politicians have been able to contain challenges from
rural protestors, who are often spread over vast areas and largely cut off from one
another, to the politicians’ advantage. In fact, citizens’ protests against the State
Government of Sarawak have sometimes served to strengthen the State government’s
autonomy. Symbiotic relations between federal and State politicians have also helped
diffuse federal-State conflicts.17
9 Tensions between the centre and North East Peninsular Malaysia
At the time of Malayan independence in 1957, the ruling Alliance coalition gave lip
service to State autonomy in finances, as this had been the status quo, especially for the
five Unfederated Malay States of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu18.
However, according to the Malaysian Constitution, tax may be levied only by the
federal government or with the authority of federal law.19 State Governments can only
                                                
15 Although Sabah briefly had a Chinese Chief Minister right after joining Malaysia, other Malaysian
States, except for the predominantly Chinese State of Pulau Pinang, have never had a Chinese chief
minister.
16 Sarawak, the largest State in Malaysia, has an area of 124,499 square kilometres, while Sabah has an
area of 73,619 square kilometres, less than sixty per cent of Sarawak’s size. Sarawak has a smaller
population than Sabah. In 2000, the Sarawak population was 2.01 million, compared to 2.45 million in
Sabah.
17 State elections in Sarawak have also been held at different times than federal parliamentary elections,
when federal politicians – to whom State politicians are allied – can help in political campaigns. This
has been an incentive for politicians in the State ruling coalition to consolidate their alliance with the
Federal Government ruling coalition. Sarawak has the most parliamentary seats, i.e. 27 of the 192 for
the whole nation. Symbiotic alliances with Sarawak politicians have given the federal ruling coalition
more members of parliament, ensuring continued incumbency for both.
18 The chief minister of Kedah, for example, noted, on 25 July 1956, that Kedah had enjoyed greater
administrative autonomy before the Japanese Occupation during the Second World War.
19 In December 1999, the PAS State government in Terengganu was reported to have been considering
the collection of an agricultural land tax known as kharaj. Since land is a State matter, kharaj would
fall under the State government’s jurisdiction. Disputes between the State Government and the Federal
Government over the issue eventually fizzled out as the Terengganu State government shelved its
plans.40
borrow from the Federal Government or from sources approved by the Federal
Government for up to five years.20
As noted earlier, Kelantan has been led by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) for
many years, and has long had conflicts with the Federal Government.21 PAS ruled
Kelantan from 1959, joined the expanded ruling coalition in 1973, and then was forced
out just before the 1978 state election, in which it lost Kelantan. During its years in
political opposition to the ruling coalition, Kelantan has been discriminated against in
terms of federal grant allocations. In the mid-1970s, PAS joined the ruling coalition for
a few years and was rewarded with higher federal allocations for Kelantan. After PAS
recaptured the state in 1990, Kelantan’s allocations have again been adversely affected.
In the federal and peninsular State elections of 1999, PAS made significant inroads,
capturing Terengganu and many seats in Kedah and Pahang as well. Since then, the
ruling UMNO has sought to isolate and weaken the seemingly ascendant PAS, even
withholding petroleum royalties previously paid directly to the Terengganu State
government.
The government of the East Coast State of Terengganu filed a suit against Petronas and
the Federal Government on 8 March 2001 over this non-payment of petroleum royalties
to the State.22 The Federal Government had told Petronas to stop paying petroleum
royalties to the Terengganu State Government. The Federal Government has diverted
the oil royalties to a discretionary fund for expenditure in the State under Federal
Government and federal ruling coalition control.23 The Federal Government took
RM521,863,062 as special payment from Petronas for the people of Terengganu, which
                                                
20 ‘Borrowing’ is interpreted to include raising money by entering into an agreement whereby the
Government has to repay or refund any benefits it enjoys under the agreement (Constitution of
Malaysia, Article 111(2)). This constitutional amendment sought to overcome the Court’s decision
against the Federal Government argument that the agreement between the Kelantan State Government
and a corporation for advance royalty payments amounted to borrowing (Shafruddin, 1987: 66-67).
21 Kelantan’s problems of insufficient financial resources date back to colonial times. A Memorandum
of the Ex-Officio Members of the Kelantan State Executive Council in 1956 stated that there were
insufficient development grants then for roads, land development and water supply (Records of the
Colonial Office).
22 Terengganu Economic Development, Petroleum and Human Resources Committee chairman Mustafa
Ali said, ‘The action is taken since there is no clear signs (sic) that the rights to the royalty will be
given back to the government and people of Terengganu after they were taken away six months ago.
The grounds given for the action against Petronas were breach of agreement signed with the State
government, discrimination against the Terengganu Government, deprivation of property right (sic)
without adequate compensation in breach of Article 13 of the Federal Constitution. That equitable
estoppel does not enable the royalty payment to Terengganu, which had been going on for more than
20 years, to be stopped and that Petronas ought not to have complied with illegal direction of the
federal government’ (Sarawak Tribune, 9 March 2001, ‘Terengganu govt files suit on oil royalty’).
23 It was reported that the Terengganu State Government will receive RM90 million from the Federal
Government if the State runs a budget deficit. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Finance Ministry
told Parliament (Dewan Rakyat, or Lower House) that the allocation would be made after the Auditor-
General’s Department verified that the State was experiencing a deficit. The RM90 million was part of
an initial allocation of RM400 million approved for 2000/2001 for the special fund established for
Terengganu.41
was credited into the trustee account of the special fund under Section 9 of the Financial
Procedures Act 1957.24
These conflicts between the Federal Government on the one hand and the opposition
PAS-held States of Terengganu and Kelantan on the other reflect party rivalries. Greater
electoral support for PAS not only reflects resurgent Islamism’s growing political
influence, but also greater marginalization, socio-economic deprivation, frustration and
dissent in the two East Coast States. Both States have had the two highest incidences of
poverty in the Peninsula from pre-independence days (according to Colonial Office
records) despite Terengganu’s thriving economy two centuries ago and more recent oil
wealth.
Apparently, development allocations to the states do not seek to reduce inter-state or
inter-regional inequalities. The improved allocations for Kedah from the tenth highest
during the Third Malaysia Plan period (1976-80) to the sixth highest in the current
Eighth Malaysia Plan period (2001-2005) is widely attributed to the Kedah-born Prime
Minister’s political concerns and provincialism. Conversely, Kelantan’s share
deteriorated from seventh to tenth over the same period. Meanwhile, the allocation for
Selangor rose from sixth highest to third highest. Similarly, the poor state of
Terengganu has also been allocated relatively less development funds, while the reverse
has been true for the more developed state of Johor (Table 17 and Figure 5).
As stated earlier, the relatively greater funds allocated to the poor states of Sabah and
Sarawak – compared to their counterparts in the peninsula – have not been enough to
compensate for the states’ much large sizes (Table 18 and Figure 6). Sarawak was
favoured from the 1980s, after the state ruling coalition was challenged from within,
with the contending factions remaining within the national ruling coalition. However,
no similar privileges have been accorded to the other poor states of Kelantan, Sabah and
Terengganu, where opposition to the national ruling coalition has been stronger and led
to opposition control of the state governments. In fact, the relative per capita allocation
to Sabah declined over the period reviewed (Table 19 and Figure 7) despite the growing
incidence of poverty in the state.
10 Conclusion
The Federation of Malaya had a centralized administration developed towards the end
of the British colonial period. The circumstances of the formation of the Federation of
Malaysia initially reversed this trend temporarily, with guarantees of greater autonomy
for Sabah and Sarawak to induce them to join the new Malaysian federation. However,
centralization has advanced over the years since within the context of a federal system.
                                                
24 Up to mid-March, such spending included the Program Mesra Rakyat (Befriend the People)
(RM7,609,305), the Natural Disaster Fund (RM298,648), management of institutions of higher
learning in the State (RM40 million), the Terengganu Education Fund (RM35,595,450), welfare
programme (RM500,000), the Special Entrepreneur Development Programme (RM1,908,392) and the
Special Rural Development Programme (RM3,106,420) (Sarawak Tribune, 30 March 2001,
‘Terengganu to receive RM90 million if in deficit’).42
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Johor 1,832 (2) 2,929 (4) 4,529 (1) 3,794 (2) 3,613 (4) 5,937 (4)
Kedah 854 (10) 2,389 (8) 2,659 (9) 2,826 (5) 3,341 (5) 5,180 (6)
Kelantan 1,019 (7) 2,848 (5) 3,621 (7) 2,064 (9) 1,850 (10) 2,905 (10)
Melaka 328 (12) 940 (12) 520 (13) 924 (11) 1,191 (12) 2,465 (11)
N. Sembilan 617 (11) 1,131 (11) 1,302 (10) 1,548 (10a) 1,801 (11) 5,221 (5)
Pahang 2,054 (1) 2,944 (3) 4,118 (3) 2,837 (4) 3,090 (7) 3,821 (9)
Perak 1,792 (3) 2,834 (6) 3,738 (6) 2,563 (7) 3,216 (6) 4,849 (7)
Perlis 156 (13) 304 (13) 560 (12) 505 (12) 953 (13) 1,581 (13)
P.Pinang 894 (9) 1,236 (10) 1,257 (11) 1,548 (10b) 1,968 (9) 4,040 (8)
Sabah 1,452 (5) 3,172 (2) 3,913 (4) 2,307 (8) 4,495 (2) 7,990 (2)
Sarawak 1,657 (4) 2,608 (7) 3,464 (8) 3,209 (3) 4,548 (1) 8,676 (1)
Selangor* 1,413 (6) 3,677 (1) 4,365 (2) 4,295 (1) 4,296 (3) 7,848 (3)
Terengganu 911 (8) 2,023 (9) 3,790 (5) 2,729 (6) 2,553 (8) 2,443 (12)
Note: Development allocation rather than development expenditure is used because information
on the later covers a shorter time period.
* Excludes Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
Figures in brackets indicate ranks from highest to lowest.
Sources: Various Malaysia Plan documents.
Table 18













Johor 96 (5) 154 (9) 239 (8) 200 (8) 190 (8) 313 (7)
Kedah 91 (7) 253 (5) 282 (6) 300 (5) 354 (5) 549 (6)
Kelantan 68 (10) 191 (6) 242 (7) 138 (9) 124 (10) 195 (9)
Melaka 199 (2) 570 (2) 315 (4) 560 (3) 722 (3) 1,493 (3)
N. Sembilan 93 (6) 170 (7) 196 (9) 233 (6) 271 (6) 786 (5)
Pahang 57 (11) 82 (11) 115 (11) 79 (11) 86 (11) 106 (12)
Perak 85 (8) 135 (10) 178 (10) 122 (10) 153 (9) 231 (8)
Perlis 196 (3) 383 (4) 705 (2) 635 (2) 1,199 (2) 1,989 (2)
P. Pinang 867 (1) 1,199 (1) 1,219 (1) 1,501 (1) 1,909 (1) 3,923 (1)
Sabah 20 (12) 43 (12) 53 (12) 31 (12) 61 (12) 109 (11)
Sarawak 13 (13) 21 (13) 28 (13) 26 (13) 37 (13) 70 (13)
Selangor* 178 (4) 462 (3) 549 (3) 550 (4) 540 (4) 987 (4)
Terengganu 70 (9) 156 (8) 293 (5) 211 (7) 197 (7) 189 (10)
* Excludes Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
Figures in brackets indicate ranks from highest to lowest.
Sources: Various Malaysia Plan documents.43
Table 19











Johor 1,114 (6) 1,651 (11) 2,276 (6) 1,800 (6) 1,353 (11)
Kedah 761 (10b) 1,983 (6) 2,092 (8) 2,000 (5a) 2,115 (6)
Kelantan 1,207 (5) 2,892 (3) 3,231 (3) 1,700 (7) 1,215 (13)
Melaka 644 (11) 1,889 (8) 1,015 (13) 1,600 (8a) 2,008 (7)
N. Sembilan 1,003 (7) 1,833 (9) 1,979 (10) 2,100 (4) 2,153 (5)
Pahang 2,885 (1) 3,378 (2) 3,574 (2) 2,700 (2a) 2,393 (3)
Perak 930 (9) 1,464 (12) 1,861 (11) 1,200 (10) 1,518 (9)
Perlis 761(10a) 1,911 (7) 3,162 (4) 2,700 (2b) 4,213 (1)
P. Pinang 935 (8) 1,222 (13) 1,137 (12) 1,499 (9) 1,578 (8)
Sabah 1,762 (2) 2,797 (4) 2,712 (5) 1,600 (8b) 1,513 (10)
Sarawak 1,372 (4) 1,851 (10) 2,059 (9) 2,000 (5b) 2,244 (4)
Selangor* 643 (12) 2,444 (5) 2,145 (7) 2,200 (3) 1,347 (12)
Terengganu 1,732 (3) 3,391 (1) 5,346 (1) 3,700 (1) 2,470 (2)
* Excludes Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
Figures in brackets indicate ranks from highest to lowest.
Source: Calculated with data from various Malaysia Plans and Yearbook of Statistics, Malaysia.
Consequently, State Governments have surrendered various functions to the Federal
Government for various reasons, including lack of fiscal resources. In response, State
Governments – including those led by members of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition
– have requested reassigning certain revenues from the Federal Government to State
coffers.25 Such views have been most strongly expressed by representatives of the
Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak as well as Terengganu asking for higher petroleum
royalties for their States. As founding members of the Malaysian Federation, the Borneo
States have emphasized that they had expected net transfers of public funds in their
favour – rather than the converse – from joining the federation. Instead, there is
considerable evidence of a significant drain of economic resources away from the two
States to national (Kuala Lumpur) and regional centres (Singapore, Hong Kong,
Australia, New Zealand). Consequently, many in the Borneo states are of the view that
their expectations from joining the Malaysian federation have been betrayed.
Over the decades, Federal Government financing for State Governments has shifted
from grants to loans, further reinforcing federal control of the States. While disbursing
loans – instead of grants – may require greater accountability on the part of the State
Governments, expecting repayment is unrealistic because of the State Governments’
limited revenue sources. However, the loans enable the Federal Government to assert
                                                
25 During the colonial era, State Governments also requested reassigning certain revenues from the
Federal Government to the State Governments, in one case reflecting conflicts between Kedah and
some southern States of the peninsula. The conflicts included the imposition of export duties for
certain exports to Singapore and the ban on exports of certain tree species.44
greater control over the State governments, particularly when they are run by opposition
parties or coalitions, or even by more independently minded members of the ruling
coalition. Among the Malaysian States not under opposition control, the Sarawak State
government probably enjoys most autonomy after the successful entry of UMNO into
Sabah (Lim, 1997). Although the Borneo States have more constitutionally guaranteed
autonomy than the Peninsular Malaysian States, they probably suffer greater abuse and
poverty, partly because their greater autonomy has been abused by self-serving political
business elites.
In short, economic resource (especially petroleum, gas and timber) extraction and
political competition have reshaped federalism in Malaysia. This has led to the
‘politicization’ and manipulation of the original terms of Malaysian federalism –
especially federal-state relations with regard to finances – to force opposition-held
States to capitulate and, in the event of failure to do so, to ‘buy votes’ for recapture of
those States. Such tactics have exacerbated federal-State conflicts and previously
encouraged occasional threats to secede in the absence of any federal government
indication of willingness to reform more equitably, e.g. through devolution or fiscal
reform.
While federal arrangements may well be superior to unions or unitary states in dealing
with regional diversity, this paper has suggested that the overwhelming power of the
centre (federal government) at the expense of the States has increased over time since
Malayan independence in 1957 and the creation of the Malaysian federation in 1963.
Undoubtedly, the federal government has successfully used – and abused – its authority
and powers to overcome regional political opposition expressed in the capture of State
governments. This has enabled the federal government to secure the bulk of petroleum
rents extracted from the States, especially Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu.
The apparently generous fiscal transfers from the centre to these petroleum rich States
actually obscure the considerable oil rent transfers to the centre from these States. Some
of this seeming generosity has been due to the terms of the Borneo States’ entry into the
Malaysian federation as well as the earlier hints of secession or demands for greater
regional autonomy as options, especially before the 1990s. However, resource transfers
from the States to the federal centre are not obvious to most in Sabah and Sarawak, and
have probably been obscured by the regional elites’ rapacious and ostentatious
accumulation and abuse of timber wealth.
Continued access to this dwindling source of natural resource wealth has probably also
deterred the States’ elites from challenging the centre’s claim to most petroleum
resource rents. As timber resources are exhausted, these elites will inevitably turn their
sights to the oil and gas offshore, but since they have never really claimed these mineral
resource rents strongly before, their belated efforts may not enjoy much popular
legitimacy and potential for political mobilization, let alone succeed.
Not surprisingly, there continues to be considerable resentment in the two Borneo States
of the federal government, expressed in various changing ways over time.26 However,
for the time being, the challenges from the Borneo States – which peaked in the 1980s –
seem to have receded with the consolidated hegemony of Muslim-Chinese-led
                                                
26 Including bloody fights between troops recruited from Sarawak and those deployed from the peninsula, or
in the especially strong support for Borneo football teams playing against teams from the peninsula.45
consociational elite alliances. While non-Muslim Bumiputeras have become
increasingly alienated, most do not see any alternative in the short term, but to make the
most of patronage by these alliances. Things seem to have changed in recent years,
however, with the ultimate central control over the Sabah government since 1994, and
the dependence of the Taib government for central support since the failed ‘palace
coup’ in 1987 known as the Ming Court Hotel affair, and the more recent Muslim-
Malay challenge to his supposed ‘Melanau clique’ control.
With the declining legitimacy of the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition
among Muslim Malays in the peninsula, especially after the sacking of then Deputy
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998, and the federal government’s
increased demonization and persecution of the Islamist Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party, or PAS) after its electoral gains in the November 1999 federal
elections, it has used the federal financial system to put the two PAS-held States under
greater fiscal pressure, especially by depriving the State of Terengganu of its petroleum
royalty payments. With increased support for the opposition in Kedah and Pahang, it is
quite possible that the ruling coalition’s drive against the opposition will be reflected in
new abuses of Malaysian federalism, especially federal-state finances.
It therefore seems quite likely that the federal system may be further de-legitimized and
even undermined in Malaysia, not only by persistent frustrations in the Borneo States,
but also by greater opposition from those States in the peninsula disaffected with the
current regime. For the time being though, the successful reconfiguration of ethnic
politics in the Borneo States – with hegemonic Muslim-Chinese elite alliances and
hapless large non-Muslim Bumiputera minorities – has contained the challenge from
Sabah and Sarawak.
However, the increasingly ham-fisted ‘choking’ of the Peninsular Malaysian Malay
opposition, especially through discriminatory treatment of the two PAS-held States of
Kelantan and Terengganu, could well further undermine the legitimacy of existing
federal arrangements, with possibly unpredictable consequences. While this political
rivalry is currently primarily understood in terms of the Malay supremacist UMNO
versus the Islamicist PAS, its political expression – in terms of the unilateral reordering
of previous federal financial arrangements to deprive the opposition State governments
of fiscal means – could well unintentionally provoke regional responses which may
undermine the very legitimacy and unity of the Malaysian federation.
Political developments since late 1998 continued to erode and undermine the legitimacy
of Prime Minister Mahathir’s leadership, especially among ethnic Malays in the
northern and central States of Peninsular Malaysia, although his acceptability among
non-Malays did not change much after his unprecedentedly large electoral victory of
1995 until events from 2000 – the al-Maunah arms heist and its aftermath, the 11
September 2001 terror attacks in the US and the Bush-led anti-terror campaign as well
as the Terengganu state government’s insistence on legislating onerous ostensibly
Islamic hudud punishments in mid-2002. It also appears that the ruling Barisan Nasional
coalition has managed to secure acceptance as the only viable option in the Borneo
States despite festering non-Muslim Bumiputera frustrations as well as Malay
opposition to the incumbent Chief Minister of Sarawak. Meanwhile, the continuing
heavy-handed ruling coalition responses to the Islamic Party’s electoral success in the
November 1999 general elections, including PAS victories in Kelantan and Terengganu,
may sustain growing regional tensions within Peninsular Malaysia, even if unintended.46
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